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Restitution for Benefits Conferred
Without Request
John W. Wade*
I. INTODUCrION

The principle is now fully recognized in this country that a "person
who has been unjustly enriched at the expense of another is required to
make restitution to the other." This is the language of the first section of the Restatement of Restitution.' When one person confers a
benefit upon another without the latter's solicitation, the benefit received constitutes an enrichment-a windfall, so to speak. This benefit may take one of several forms. It may involve (1) transferring
property to the defendant, (2) saving, preserving or improving his
property, (3) rendering personal services for him, or (4) performing
for him a duty imposed directly by law or by his own contractual
arrangements. In any of these situations there is an enrichment,
and the principle quoted above comes into play if the enrichment is
"unjust." When is it unjust? Obviously, it would not be so characterized if it were intended as a gift; just as obviously, the opposite is true
if the plaintiff acted under legal compulsion and against his will. In
making the determination, considerable weight is given to the circumstance that the benefit was not requested by the defendant.
The common law has long had a pronounced policy that benefits
may not be forced upon a party against his will, so as to require
him to pay for them. This idea has been forcefully expressed on a
number of occasions. 2 Said the court in the leading English case,
"Liabilities are not to be forced upon people behind their backs any
more than you can confer a benefit upon a man against his will."3
* Dean, Vanderbilt University School of Law; author,
RESTrrTUION (2d ed. 1966).

CASES

AND MATERIALS

ON

1. RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION § 1 (1937).
2. Sometimes the viewing-with-alarm approach is used. Thus: if recovery should
be allowed, "the only person reasonably secure against demands he has never assented
to create, will be the person who, possessing nothing, is thereby protected against anything being accidentally improved by another at his cost and to his ruin." Isle Royal
Mining Co. v. Hertin, 37 Mich. 332, 338 (1877) (Cooley, C.J.). "No man's private
business, in the mode or time of it, would be under his control, or free from the
interference of strangers, perhaps, idlers, drunkards, and perhaps enemies, under such
pretences, drawing him from business into litigation." Force v. Haines, 17 N.J.L.
385, 387 (Sup. Ct. 1840).
3. Falcke v. Scottish Imperial Ins. Co., 34 Ch. D. 234, 248 (C.A. 1886) (Bowen,
L.J.). The sentence immediately preceding this reads: "The general principle is,
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Most of the time this idea has been indicated by applying an epithet
to the plaintiff. The term most frequently used is that of "volunteer."
Applied to the plaintiff, particularly if it carries the adjective "mere,"
it has proved the "kiss of death" and the sure indication that he will
not be allowed to recover. 4 Other derogatory terms used include
meddler, intermeddler, interloper, mere stranger, mere impertinence.5
The Restatement uses the adjective, "officious," which carries a somewhat more restricted connotation. 6 All of these terms embody the
policy that one should not be required to pay for benefits which he
did not solicit and does not desire.
It would not be inappropriate to regard this policy as conflicting
with the unjust-enrichment principle, so that the two vie for dominance in general and for application in each fact situation in particular. Most statements of a rule have indicated that the volunteerpolicy has prevailed over the unjust-enrichment principle, but a study
of the cases indicates that there is a fairly delicate, and somewhat
precarious balance between them and that the line of demarcation
beyond all question, that work or labour done or money expended by one man
to preserve or benefit the property of another do not according to English law creato
any lien upon the property saved or benefited, nor, even if standing alone, create any
obligation to repay the expenditure." Though the whole paragraph has been frequently
quoted, it has been suggested that the last clause of the sentence above, regarding
the existence of an "obligation to repay" is mere dictum, since the plaintiff was
actually seeking a lien, and the law is clear that a lien is not available. COFF &
JoNEs, Br.sTrrtrorN 237, 239 (1966). The succeeding paragraph, contrasting the
maritime law of salvage, is quoted note 146 infra. Lord Kenyon expressed the idea
first in Exall v. Partridge, 8 T.R. 308, 310, 101 Eng. Rep. 1405, 1406 (K.B. 1799):
"It has been said that where one person is benefited by the payment of money by
another, the law raises an assumpsit against the former; but that I deny: if that were
so, and I owed a sum of money to a friend, and an enemy chose to pay that debt,
the latter might convert himself into my debtor [sic; creditor], nolens volens." For
American quotations: "One cannot thrust himself upon me, and make me his debtor,
whether I will or not." State v. Village of St. Johnsbury, 59 Vt. 332, 342, 10 At.
531, 535 (1887). "The law does not permit the liability of a party for a debt to one
person to be shifted so as to make him debtor to another without his consent."
Inhabitants of South Scituate v. Inhabitants of Hanover, 75 Mass. 420, 421 (1857).
Perhaps it is significant that these are all early quotations.
4. Cf. Pomeroy: "The term is applied somewhat indiscriminately in the reports to
almost anyone who applies for subrogation and is refused, no matter what the reason
be, so that many statements of the courts are misleading." 5 Poxwmanoy, EQuITY JuiusPRuDENCE § 2348 n.91 (4th ed. 1919). As used here the word "volunteer" has a
different meaning from that involved in the maxim: Equity will not aid a volunteer,
There it means a donee or person who has not paid consideration. But by a confusion
of the two ideas the maxim is sometimes used to prevent equitable relief to a person
seeking restitution.
5. See, e.g., Crippen v. Chappel, 35 Kan. 495, 11 Pac. 453 (1886); In re Leslie,
23 Ch.D. 552 (1883).
6. "A person who officiously confers a benefit upon another is not entitled to
restitution therefor." RESTATEMNT, REsTrrUTION § 2 (1937). "Officiousness means
interference in the affairs of others not justified by the circumstances under which the
interference takes place." Id., comment a.

1966]

BENEFITS CONFERRED WITHOUT REQUEST

1185

is a difficult one to draw. Instead of posing the problem in this fashion, however, it may be more accurate, and certainly more illuminating, to explain that the enrichment-principle provides for restitution
only when the enrichment is unjust and that the volunteer-policy is
a factor of consequence in determining whether or not the enrich7
ment is unjust.
On this basis, the principle that restitution is granted the plaintiff
whenever the defendant is unjustly enriched at plaintiff's expense
may be regarded as fully applicable to the cases of benefits conferred
without request. The task is to determine whether the enrichment
is unjust. Perhaps the best way to treat this problem is to examine
the cases to see what restrictions they indicate on recovery.8 These
restrictions are somewhat numerous and they may properly be given
detailed consideration.
Preliminary reference should be made, however, to another factor
which has sometimes played a part. This is the assumption that the
granting of restitutionary relief may prove an inducement to a party
to act. For this reason, when there is a recognized public interest
in having one party intervene to perform another's neglected dutysupplying of necessaries to children, for example, or burial of the
dead-restitution is normally granted.9 This is the purported reason,
also, for the maritime law of salvage-to encourage the rescue of an
endangered ship and cargo.10 This element may therefore tip the
balance whenever the court or the legislature feels that intervention
should be encouraged.
At an earlier time another factor also influenced results. This was
the circumstance that there was no actual contractual relationship
between the parties. Today, however, we recognize that there is an
obligation imposed by law, not by consent of the parties, and that
privity of contract is entirely unnecessary." Other factors may also
7. See id. § 1, comment c; § 2, comment a, 12.
8. The leading article on the general subject is Hope, Officiousness, 15 CORNELL L.Q.
25 & 205 (1929); see also Dawson, Negotiorum Gestio: The Altruistic Intermeddler,
74 IHv. L. REV. 817 & 1073 (1961); Heilman, The Rights of the Voluntary Agent
against His Principal in Roman Law and in Anglo-American Law, 4 TENN. L. REv.
34 & 76 (1925). For text treatments see RESTATEmENT, RESOrrtoN, ch. 5 (1937);
GOFF Am JONES, REsTrrunoN, ch. 14 (1966); KEENER, QuAsi-CoNTn~CTs,
ch. 7
(1893); MuNKMAN, QuAsI-CoNmACTs, chs. 5, 7 (1949); STOLJAI, QUASI-CONT AaTS,
ch. 7 (1964)

WINFIELD, QuAsi-CoNTRAcTs

§§ 18, 19 (1952);

WOODWARD, QuAis-

CoN mAcTs, clh. 14 (1913).
9. For more detailed treatment, see pp. 1195, 1203 infra.
10. The law of salvage is considered in detail at pp. 1208-10 infra.
11. See Hope, supra note 8, at 30. For a recent presentation of the earlier viewpoint,
see STOLJAR, QuAsr-CONTRnAcTS 160 (1964). In this connection it is well to bear in
mind that when there is actual consent of the parties, even though not set forth in
express words, the recovery is on the contract rather than on the basis of restitution,
as an obligation imposed as a matter of law. See discussion in Kellum v. Browning's
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be of importance in individual cases.' 2
II. RESnCONS ON RECOVERY
A. No Recovery Unless Defendant Has Received a Measurable

Enrichment
This may appear to be a self-evident proposition, and indeed it is
implicit in any statement of the enrichment principle. A benefit to

the defendant is obviously necessary before he can be held liable.
There are, however, certain embellishments on the requirement and
explanations of its meaning.
The enrichment may be negative as well as positive. One is en-

riched not only when he receives an asset but also when someone
else performs for him a duty which would be a burden to him. The
clearest case is that of one person paying another's debt. The elimina-

tion of this obligation is clearly a benefit, and meets this requirement.' 3
Of course, other restrictions may still prevent recovery.
But a recovery, when granted, is normally restricted to the net
enrichment. This is unlike the case of a benefit which was requested
by the defendant, where the cost of purchasing or conferring it is
often the measure of recovery, whether the defendant actually realized
that amount of net gain or not. The cases most aptly illustrating this

point are those involving improvements made on defendant's land
under a mistake as to ownership. Here the measure of recovery is

generally regarded as the net increase in the value of the land, rather

4
than the cost of making the improvements, if it was more.'

If the plaintiff's services did not produce any net value for the
Adm'r, 231 Ky. 308, 21 S.W.2d 459 (1929); Hertzog v. Hertzog, 29 Pa. 465 (1865).
The so-called agency by necessity usually involves an inference that the agent was
authorized to act in the emergency. See RESTATEmENT (SECOND), AzEicY § 47 (1958);

contrast this with § 14-I, involving a "restitutional power."
12. See, e.g., Scoville v. Vail Inv. Co., 55 Ariz. 486, 103 P.2d 662 (1940); Stein
v. Simpson, 37 Cal. 2d 79, 230 P.2d 816 (1951); Mehl v. Norton, 201 Minn. 203, 275
N.W. 843 (1937).
13. But cf. Hope, supra note 8, at 206, n.3. Mr. Hope suggests that there is actually
no benefit since one creditor is simply being substituted for another, and the only thing
that occurs is that defendant's burden is not increased, citing Butler v. Rice, [1910] 2
Ch. 277. This argument involves a logical lapse in an otherwise extremely valuablo
article. Applied literally it would mean that there is never an unjust enrichment.
Whenever the defendant has received a positive benefit, if he is required to pay for it
he is no better off and his situation has not changed. The time to determine whether
there is a benefit is before an obligation is imposed from defendant to plaintiff, and
the very purpose of making the determination is to decide whether to create the
obligation.
14. See, e.g., Combs v. Deaton, 199 Ky. 477, 251 S.W. 638 (1923); Reimann v.
Baum, 115 Utah 147, 203 P.2d 387 (1949); REsTAT&E.rENT, REsrrMoN §§ 42(1),
53(2) (1937).
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defendant, then recovery is usually not justified. 15 A possible exception to this involves personal services to an incapable defendant.
Thus, when an unconscious patient was given emergency treatment
by a doctor who failed to save him, recovery was allowed. 16 So also
when an attorney failed in an action of habeas corpus to release the
defendant from an asylum, and she died while he was working on
n
other relief.

There may be other factors which affect the determination of
whether there was a true benefit. Thus, when the defendant was contesting the validity of a debt and might have been relieved from
paying it, the court held that it was not clear that payment by the
plaintiff was beneficial. 18 In another case, the court explained that
payment of another's debt is beneficial, "provided no option or privilege of the person primarily or actually liable is thereby intercepted,
or abridged or substantially altered." 9 Other situations may easily
be conceived where a detriment connected with the benefit causes
its value to be outweighed.
A reasonably certain measurement of the enrichment is also needed.
Thus, where the plaintiff saves the defendant's life, it certainly would
not be thought that the total value of the defendant's life expectancy
is the measure of the enrichment. There is, indeed, no accurate basis
for measuring the benefit, and this may well be an important reason
why courts have been slow to grant recovery in this situation.20 On
the other hand, if the plaintiff is a doctor who has regular fees for
treating a patient, this difficulty does not exist and recovery is more
freely granted. Similarly, in the case of action to save property from
destruction, recovery should not be granted for the full value of the
property, and if there is no other way of determining the value of
the services, recovery is unlikely.
In this type of situation courts sometimes resort to a device used
in actions for breach of contract when the normal measure of damages
15. See, e.g., Mulligan v. Kenny, 34 La. Ann. 50 (1882), where plaintiff replaced
some rotted beams and other timbers in a church tower, without consent or approval

of defendant. On the basis that the work to repair the tower adequately would still
need to be done and would cost as much as if the plaintiff bad done no work, the
court held that there could be no recovery. There were other bases, in addition, for a
holding for the defendant.
16. Cotnam v. Wisdom, 83 Ark. 601, 104 S.W. 164 (1907); Matheson v. Smiley,
40 Man. 247, [1932] 1 West Weekly R. 758, [1932] 2 D.L.R. 787.
17. Lyon v. Freshour's Estate, 74 Mich. 114, 140 N.W. 517 (1913).

18. Kenan v. Holloway, 16 Ala. 53 (1849).
19. Love v. Robinson, 161 Miss. 585, 591, 137 So. 499, 500 (1931).

The court went

on to explain that if a tax collector paid taxes for a property owner he would deprive

him of the two-year period of redemption and thus injure him.
20. See Dawson, Rewards for the Rescue of Human Life?, in XXT

CmNrury Com-

PARATIVE AND CoNFUracs LAw-LEGAL ESSAYS IN HONOR OF HESSEL E. YNTEmA 142

(1961).
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(what the plaintiff would have received if the contract had been
carried out) is so vague as to be almost useless; they take the test
of the expense to which the plaintiff has been put-his out-of-pocket

loss. 21 Thus, in Chase v. Corcoran,22 where the plaintiff found a

damaged boat adrift on the river and recovered and repaired it, he
was allowed a reimbursement of his "reasonable expenses of keeping
and repairing it."2 Several other cases are in accord.2 There are
some indications that this approach may also apply to damages incurred by the plaintiff in rendering his service. Thus in Sheldon v.
Sherman,25 defendants' logs broke loose from a boom and came to
rest down the river on plaintiff's land, where they remained for several
months before being reclaimed. The court held that although the
defendants were not originally at fault so as to be liable in tort, when
they removed the logs, they became responsible for payment of
damages on the basis of a promise raised by law. Application of this
measure of recovery is less likely to be generally adopted, however,
than that of out-of-pocket expenses in rendering the service to the
defendant.2
An interesting question arises when the plaintiff prevents what
would normally be a loss to the defendant, but a third party would
have been under a duty to replace that loss. Suppose, for example,
21. See McCoRtImCK, DAMAGES § 142 (1935).
22. 106 Mass. 286 (1871).
23. Id. at 288.
24. See, e.g., Reeder v. Anderson's Adm'rs, 34 Ky. 193 (1836) ("implied undertaking to (at least) indemnify any person who shall by the expenditure of time and
money, contribute to a reclamation of the lost property"); Beckwith v. Frisbie, 32 Vt.
559 (1860) (amount that bailor "might be obliged to expend in preserving his property"); cf. Amory v. Flyn, 10 Johns. R. 102 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1813) ("expense in securing"
the property). But ef. Bryan v. Akers, 177 Ark. 681, 7 S.W.2d 325 (1925) (deputy
sheriff's expenses in recovering stolen car).
25. 42 N.Y. 484 (1870), affirming 42 Barb. 368 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1864).
26. Several jurisdictions have enacted "Good Samaritan indemnification legislation,"
providing for governmental reimbursement to a private citizen injured or damaged
in attempting to prevent the commission of a crime against the personal property of
another." See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 13600-03 (Deering, 1965 Supp). There is
similar legislation in Delaware, New York City and New Zealand. See also Webb v.
McGowin, 232 Ala. 374, 168 So. 199 (1936), affirming 27 Ala. App. 82, 168 So.
196 (1935), where plaintiff was seriously injured in saving defendant's life, and a
promise to pay a weekly sum for support was held binding on the basis of a moral
consideration. Contra, Harrington v. Taylor, 225 N.C. 690, 36 S.E.2d 227 (1945). See
generally Note, Promissory Obligations Based on Past Benefits or Other Moral Consideration, 7 U. Cm. L. Bsv. 124 (1939). If the rescued person was negligent in
getting himself in the dangerous position, a plaintiff who was injured in seeking to aid
him is entitled, under modem law, to recover in a tort action. See, e.g., Ruth v.
Ruth, 213 Tenn. 82, 372 S.W.2d 285 (1963); Longacre v. Reddick, 215 S.W.2d 404
(Tex. Civ. App. 1948), 2 VAiN. L. REV. 491 (1948); cf. Talbert v. Talbert, 22 Misc.
2d 782, 199 N.Y.S.2d 212 (Sup. Ct. 1960) (son rescuing father from suicide);
Rushton v. Howle, 79 Ga. App. 360, 53 S.E.2d 768 (1949) (attempt to save defendant's
car).
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that the plaintiff saved the defendant's property from fire, but the
property was insured or the defendant would have been able to recover the value of the property from the person who negligently
started the fire. What is the enrichment under these circumstances?
There seem to be no authorities directly in point, but several cases
involving maritime salvager are analogous. The holding in The
Meandros28 would suggest that defendant is liable for the value of the
services in saving the ship.2 On the other hand, there are several
cases which indicate that the insurance company should be liable
since it received a substantial benefit in the prevention of the loss.
This is strongly suggested in the case of The GL 40,30 and other cases
imply as much. 31 Several cases indicate that when the salvor's action
prevented or reduced a third party's liability to the owner in negligence, he is entitled to salvage from that party. 32 There are helpful
27. For detailed discussion of the relationship of the law of salvage to the common
law of restitution, see pp. 1208-10 infra.
28. [1925] P. 61 (1924).
29. Defendants, a Greek company, owned a steamship which was requisitioned during the war between Greece and Turkey, under terms of requisition providing that the
master and crew were to be conscripted into the Greek forces, and the vessel was
to be returned after the period in the same condition as before the period. The
vessel stranded and was saved from likely total loss by the plaintiffs. To defendants'
contention that they received no benefit since they would have had a claim against
the Greek government for the value of the ship, the court answered: "As a result of
the salvage they have their ship and not a claim, and to say that they received no
benefit from the salvage services seems to me to be illusory. In my judgment benefit
was denied by the services." Id. at 67. Cf. Seaman v. Erie Ry., 21 Fed. Cas. 918
(No. 12, 582) (E.D.N.Y. 1868).
30. 66 F.2d 764 (2d Cir. 1933): "The insurer had a direct interest in the raising of
the barge, requested the libellant to perform the service and is therefore liable in an
action in personam by the salvor to recover the value of the services .

. .

. The only

benefit the insurer could derive from salvage of the barge was diminution of its
liability under the policy." Id. at 766-67. Note that the insurer had requested the
action of the salvor in this case; it had already paid almost the full value of the
barge.
31. See, e.g., The Cargo ex Port Victor, [1901] P. 243 (C.A.) (charterer liable for
salvage of goods when it was responsible for their safe delivery); cf. United States
v. Cornell Steamboat Co., 202 U.S. 184 (1906) (United States liable for salvage on
bags of sugar saved from fire because custom duties saved; salvage 10% of custom
duties). See also Five Steel Barges, 15 P.D. 142 (1890); Duncan v. Dundee Shipping
Co., [1878] Sess. Cas. (5 Rettie) 742 (Scot. 1st Div.).
32. This is held in Tice Towing Line v. James McWilliams Blue Line, 51 F.2d
243 (S.D.N.Y. 1931), where the court said, "A claim for salvage may be maintained
in personam against any party whose relationship to the vessel or thing salved is such
that he might have been liable in respect of its damage or loss . . . or who, though not
its owner, is benefited by its being salved ..
" Id. at 246. On appeal the holding
was modified because the claim against the tortfeasor, the Director General of Railroads,
was not made within the statutory period, but the court was ready to "assume, arguendo,
that the libellant had such a claim; that through its services the tort to the cargoes was
parried; and that the tort-feasor's consequent relief from liability was a benefit which
brought him within the same class as those whose property had been salved." Tice
Towing Line v. James McWilliams Blue Line, 57 F.2d 183, 184 (2d Cir. 1932).
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analyses, also, in some decisions outside the maritime area. In Leeboo v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co.,33 where a construction
contractor with insurance against his liability for damage to land went
to considerable expense to avert an impending landslide, he was allowed to recover expenses against the insurance company. 34 In
Schneider v. Eisovitch,-' plaintiff and her husband were negligently
struck by the defendant in France, the husband being killed and
plaintiff seriously hurt. Her brother-in-law and his wife came from
England to make arrangements for bringing her and her husband's
body back. The court held that, even assuming the plaintiff was
not legally bound to pay the brother-in-law, she might recover from
the defendant a sum sufficient to reimburse the brother-in-law for
his out-of-pocket expenses so long as they were reasonable. Pertinent also are the numerous cases holding that one who is injured in
seeking to rescue another's person or property from danger created36
by a tortfeasor can recover from the tordfeasor for his negligence.
Although there are gaps in the combined coverage of these cases,
the net effect of the combination is the suggestion that if the defendant is held liable for the value of the plaintiff's services, he may
recover from the third party whose liability in contract or tort was
averted, and that the plaintiff might perhaps have a direct action
against that third party. It seems likely that if all three parties are
joined in a single suit, plaintiff's chance of recovery would be good.
At least, he would be able to show a net benefit in the two defendants.
B. No Recovery if PlaintiffIntended To Act Gratuitously
Quite obviously an enrichment is not unjust if it was bestowed
upon the defendant as a gift. Nor should one be allowed to recover
See also Shamrock Towing Co. v. Schiavone-Bonomo Corp., 275 F.2d 338 (2d Cir.
1960); The Public Bath No. 13, 61 Fed. 692 (S.D.N.Y. 1894).
33. 401 Pa. 477, 165 A.2d 82 (1960).
34. Said the court: "It would be a strange kind of argument and an equivocal type
of justice which would hold that the defendant would be compelled to pay out, let us
say, the sum of $100,000 if the plaintiff had not prevented what would have been
inevitable, and yet not be called upon to pay the smaller sum which the plaintiff
actually expended to avoid a foreseeable disaster." Id. at 481, 165 A.2d at 84.
But cf. Fair v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 235 Ark. 185, 357 S.W.2d 544 (1962), when
an oil driller acted to minimize damage to adjoining property and was not allowed to
recover for his expense from the insurance company on the ground that the possible
damage was too speculative.
35. [1960] 2 Q.B. 430, [1960] 1 All E.R. 169 (1959).
36. The leading case is Wagner v. International Ry., 232 N.Y. 176, 133 N.E. 437
(1921).
37. "Thus . . .one who makes a gift . . . confers a benefit; . . . he (is not]
entitled to restitution." RFSTATEmENT, RESTTuTiON § 1, comment c (1937). See Ryan
v. Johnson, 220 Md. 70, 150 A.2d 906 (1959).
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for services which he rendered without any intent to charge for them. 38
A change of circumstances so that the plaintiff does not now wish
to render a gift is normally held not to alter the result. Once having
made the gift or rendered the gratuitous service he cannot now
39
change his mind and seek to recover- because of new conditions.
On the other hand, if a gift is made under a mistake as to existing
circumstances, although earlier cases denied restitutionary relief,40
the more recent cases usually permit recovery ,when the actual circumstances make it equitable.41 If the mistake is to a material fact
inducing the making of the gift, the donative intent should no longer
be controlling and restitution may be granted.
Perhaps a majority of the cases in which the presence or absence
of intent to charge is involved are concerned with services rendered
to relatives living in the home. Courts have declared that while it
is normally presumed that one who renders services intends to charge
for them, the presumption is that they are gratuitous when they
are rendered to a relative.42 Other factors, such as the reciprocal
38. See, e.g., St. Jude's Church v. Van Denberg, 31 Mich. 287 (1875), where a
churchman who was senior warden and vestrymen, also served as sexton; but was
unable to recover for his services in the latter capacity because "the circumstances not
only fail to indicate that the services were rendered or received for compensation, but
clearly repel the idea that payment was to be made or asked for." Id. at 289. See
also Osborn v. Boeing Airplane Co., 309 F.2d 99 (9th Cir. 1962): "Thus an obligation
to pay, ordinarily, will not be implied in fact or by law if it is clear that there was
indeed no expectation of payment, that a gratuity was intended to be conferred, that
the benefit was conferred officiously, or that the question of payment was left to the
unfettered direction of the recipient." Id. at 102. See also Dusenka v. Dusenka, 221
Minn. 234, 21 N.W.2d 528 (1946).
39. See, e.g.,-Silano v. Carosella, 272 Mass. 203, 172 N.E. 216 (1930), where plaintiffs looked after defendant's small daughter from the death of his wife until his
remarriage some years later. "Subsequent conditions which cast an appearance of
injustice over the transaction as a gift do not afford ground for legal liability. A gift
flowing from unalloyed good will commonly promotes friendship and stimulates thankfulness, but ingratitude cannot transmit a gift into an obligation enforceable at law."
Id. at 206, 172 N.E. at 218. See also Dome's Estate, 54 York Leg. Rec. 93 (Orphans'
Ct., Pa. 1940). Many of the cases illustrating this rule are those where the plaintiff
acted in anticipation of a later gift or legacy and was later disappointed. See, e.g.,
Payne v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 128 Cal. App. 2d 295, 275 P.2d 128
(1954); Brown v. McCurdy, 278 Pa. 19, 122 Atl. 169 (1923); Osborn v. Governors of
Guy's Hosp., 2 Strange 728, 93 Eng. Rep. 812 (K.B. 1727).
40. See, e.g., St. Joseph's Orphan Soc'y v. Wolpert, 80 Ky. 86 (1882); Chariton
County v. Hartman, 190 Mo. 71, 88 S.W. 617 (1905).
41. See, e.g., Old Man's Home, Inc. v. Lee's Estate, 191 Miss. 699, 4 So. 2d 235
(1941); Deskovick v. Porzio, 78 N.J.Super. 82, 187 A.2d 610 (App. Div. 1963), 42
N.C.L. REv. 247 (1963); In re Agnew's Will, 132 Misc. 466, 230 N.Y. Supp. 519 (Surr.
Ct. 1928); Conkling's Estate v. Champlin, 193 Okla. 79, 141 P.2d 569 (1943).
42. See, e.g., In re Tilghman's Estate, 240 Minn. 494, 61-N.W.2d 743 (1953);
Twiford v. Waterfield, 240 N.C. 582, 83 S.E.2d 548 (1954); Ibach .v. Hoffman, 184
Ore. 296, 198 P.2d 266 (1948); Hehdryx v. Turner, 109 Wash: 672, 187 Pac. 372
(1920). See Comment, Quasi-Confracts-RelationshipsRaising Presumption of Gratuity,
6 FoaawmH
L. REv. 417 (1937).
.1,
_%

1192

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. 19

rendering of services, the nature of the services, the closeness of the
relationship of the parties, may affect the determination. 43 Actually,
most of these cases turn upon the question of whether there is a true
contract between the parties to pay for the services-a contract
implied-in-fact from the circumstances. But these same circumstances
also affect the determination as to whether quasi-contractual or restitutionary relief should be granted. 44 For, even though there is no
contract implied in fact, a restitutionary remedy may be available.
If the recipient of the services is incapable of contracting, for example,
the same question is present as to whether or not a gift was intended, Gratuitous services may also be the basis for a quasi-contractual recovery, if mistake vitiates the reason for the gratuity.
When the courts speak of presumptions in family-services cases,
they are speaking of presumptions of fact, which are subject to being
rebutted by a showing that the facts are actually otherwise. 6 In
a different group of cases, however, the presumption is treated as
a rule of law. The first case of significance is Bartholomew v. Jackson,47 where plaintiff, having saved defendant's wheat stack from a
fire, received a jury verdict of fifty cents as the value of his services.
The court reversed, saying: "If a man humanely bestows his labor,
and even risks his life, in voluntarily aiding to preserve his neighbor's
house from destruction by fire, the law considers the service rendered
as gratuitous, and it, therefore, forms no ground of action."48 The
Louisiana court applied the same approach to a flood, 49 and the
Oregon court in a flight of eloquence seemed to apply it more
broadly.50
43. See generally Havinghurst, Services in the Home-A Study in Contract Concepts
in Domestic Relations, 41 YA.E L.J. 386 (1932). The numerous cases are collected
and organized in the extensive annotation in 7 A.L.R.2d 8-191 (1949).
44. See, e.g., Kellum v. Browning's Adm'r, 231 Ky. 308, 21 S.W.2d 459 (1929);
Thompson v. Hunter's Ex'r, 269 S.W.2d 266 (Ky. 1954); Comment, 6 Formaua L.
RE.v. 417 (1937).
45. See In re Rhodes, 44 Ch. D. 94 (C.A. 1889), involving an insane person, where
it is made clear that recovery would be in quasi-contract. Under the circumstances of
the case, it was held that the contributions amounted to a gift. Cf. Schaefer v.
Schaefer, 255 Mass. 175, 151 N.E. 119 (1926).
46. See discussion in the cases cited in note 42 supra.
47. 20 Johns. R. 28 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1822). In the earlier New York case Dunbar v.
Williams, 10 Johns. R. 249 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1813), a physician had treated the defendant's
slave for a "foul disease" without notifying the defendant, and the court said that so
long as he did the work without taking care that the owner's consent was obtained,
"the service must be deemed gratuitous." There was no emergency here, and no
reason to assume that the presumption of gratuity is irrebutable. But this case seems
to have influenced the holding in Bartholomew.
48. 20 Johns. R. at 28.
49. Watson v. Ledoux, 8 La. Ann. 68 (1853); cf. New Orleans, Ft. J. & G.I.R.R.
v. Turcan, 46 La. Ann. 161, 15 So. 187 (1894).
50. Glenn v. Savage, 14 Ore. 567, 13 Pac. 442 (1887). The plaintiff had saved
some building materials of the defendant which had fallen into the Columbia River.
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These are all early cases and their authority is now somewhat
doubtful. More recent cases permitting recovery when a doctor
renders emergency services to an unconscious person may perhaps
be distinguished on the ground that the doctor is normally acting as
a professional person and expecting to charge. 51 Even so, this indicates that there is not an inflexible rule of law, but that the facts

should control. The presumption should appropriately be treated
as it is in the family-service cases, as an indication of the normal

assumption to be drawn from the facts as to the plaintiff's intentionthat he acted in the emergency without any thought of charging the
defendant for his services-but subject to rebuttal by other available
facts. And if the plaintiff incurs expenses in rendering the emergency

aid, he would not normally be expecting to make a gift of this to
the defendant. If there is any presumption as to this, it should be
that the plaintiff is expecting reimbursement

2

Said the court: "The law will never permit a friendly act or such as was intended to be
an act of kindness or benevolence, to be afterwards converted into a pecuniary demand;
it would be doing violence to some of the kindest and best effusions of the heart, to
suffer them afterwards to be perverted by sordid avarice. Whatever differences may
arise afterwards among men, let those meritorious and generous acts remain lasting
monuments of the good offices intended in the days of good neighborhood and friendship; and let no after circumstances even tarnish or obliterate them from the recollection
of the parties." Id. at 577-78, 13 Pac. at 448. In Mathie v. Hancock, 78 Vt. 414, 63
Ad. 143 (1906), where plaintiff supplied feed to the horses of a decedent, the court
gave, among other reasons for holding for the defendant, that it did not "appear that
he expected compensation, and that cannot be inferred." This is not a conclusive
presumption but seems to deny the effect of circumstantial evidence. See also State v.
Village of St. Johnsbury, supra note 3; cf. Kelley v. East Jordan Chem. Co., 162
Mich. 525, 127 N.W. 671 (1910).
51. Cotnam v. Wisdom, supra note 16; Schoenburg v. Rose, 145 N.Y. Supp. 831
(Munic. Ct. N.Y.C. 1914); Matheson v. Smiley, supra note 16. Contrast the case of
Caldwell v. Missouri State Life Ins. Co., 148 Ark. 474, 230 S.W. 566 (1921), where
an attorney acted in behalf of an insurance company which was apparently being
despoiled by its directors and was thus unable to aid itself, and induced the state
superintendent of insurance to act to save the company. It was held that he could
not recover for his services. Is there a difference between an attorney and a physician?
Have the rules of champerty and maintenance any relevance?
52. Perhaps the same position should be taken regarding any injuries incurred by the
plaintiff. There is an indirect relevance of certain tort rules to the general problem.
Though the rule may have been otherwise at one time it is now well established that
a tort feasor is liable to a person who is injured while seeking to rescue the endangered
person. See, e.g., Wagner v. International Ry., supra note 36; Eckert v. Long Island
R.R., 43 N.Y. 502 (1871). Rarely in recent times has a court refused recovery to
one seeking to save property on the ground that he is a "mere volunteer," e.g., Glines
v. Maine Cent. R.R., 94 N.H. 299, 52 A.2d 298 (1947); though conversely, it has
been held that only a volunteer, and not one under a pre-existing duty, like a fireman,
can recover. Nastasio v. Cinnamon, 295 S.W.2d 17 (Mo. 1956). The doctrine of the
rescue cases is now applied to the defendant who has jeopardized himself by his
negligence, so that the plaintiff is injured in an attempt to rescue him. E.g., Carney v.
Buryea, 271 App. Div. 338, 65 N.Y.S.2d 902 (1946); for other cases, see note 26,
supra. A "rescuee" who was negligent is therefore clearly liable for an injury to the
rescuer.
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In most of the cases involving emergency services, the plaintiff's
activities are completed before the defendant learns about them. On
some occasions, however, the defendant knows that they are being
rendered. Suppose that the plaintiff intends to charge but the defendant believes they are being rendered without charge to him. In
Merritt v. American Dock & Trust Co.,5 3 defendant's warehouse
caught fire, and plaintiff brought up two fireboats to assist in putting
out the fire. Although the plaintiff's action was observed by the defendant's officers, the court held the defendant not liable on the
ground that defendants could have assumed that the fireboats had
been ordered by the insurer of the warehouse or the owners of some
of the goods in it.m Conversely, in Elliot Hospital v. Turcotte,3 the
injured defendant was brought to the plaintiff hospital by his employer. The defendant assumed that the employer would pay for his
treatment, but was held liable to the hospital. Perhaps the correct
test was offered by the Washington court when it indicated that the
determination depends not simply upon whether the defendant believed there was no charge against him but whether he reasonably so
believed.56
A final case in this connection is Thomas v. Thomasville Shooting
Club,5 7 where plaintiff rendered services in obtaining certain hunting leases, not intending to charge for them because he expected to
be hired as a steward. Disappointed in this expectation, he was allowed to recover because the defendant club had not known his
intent and had expected to pay him. This case is not likely to modify
the general rule that one is not entitled to restitutionary relief for
services which he rendered with no intent to charge for them. In
addition, he may not recover if he caused the defendant reasonably
to believe that the services were rendered with no intent to charge
for them.
53. 27 J.&S. (59 N.Y. Super.) 83, 13 N.Y. Supp. 234 (Super. Ct. N.Y.C. 1891).
54. Cf. FbKissick, Alcorn, Magnus & Co. v. Hall, 23 Sask. 201, [1928] 3 West.
Weekly R. 509, [1929] 1 D.L.R. 48 (C.A. 1928).
55. 79 N.H. 110, 105 Ad. 361 (1918).
56. Western Asphalt Co. v. Voile, 25 Wash. 2d 428, 171 P.2d 159 (1946). The
case involved the supplying of figures for use in submitting a construction bid. The
court was speaking of a contract implied in fact, but the same rule would appropriately
apply in a quasi-contract. Cf. Engle v. Terrell, 281 Ky. 88, 134 S.W.2d 980 (1939),
where plaintiff sought contribution from other children for their part of his expenses
in supporting the parents. Though the statute required children to support their parents,
the court held that plaintiff must give advance notice and an opportunity to contribute
because they might othaerwise reasonably assume that he was acting without intent to
seek relief.
57. 121 N.C. 238, 28 S.E. 293 (1897).
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C. No Recovery if Defendant Refuses To Accept the Benefit,
Unless It Is an AppropriatePerformance of a Legal Duty
Benefits cannot be forced upon a party who declines to receive
them. This is tacitly assumed in many cases and expressly stated in
a few. Thus, in the early case of Stokes v. Lewis,5a where one parish
paid the quota of another, Lord Mansfield held that there could be no

recovery when the payment was made "in spite of their teeth." And
in Stern v. Haas,59 where plaintiff lighted and cleaned a common

passageway against defendant's will, contribution was not allowed.
Several cases have held that a plaintiff may not charge the defendant

with money expended in keeping the defendant's chattel, when the

latter has indicated he no longer wants the chattel and will not be
responsible for it. 60 In others, a plaintiff who obtained a temporary
injunction preventing interference with his activities, was not permitted to recover for the enrichment thfds created in the defendant. 61

In all of these cases the plaintiff's conduct can be characterized as
officious.
There is one recognized exception to this rule, although its precise
scope has not been clearly delineated. If the defendant fails to per-

form a duty imposed upon him by the law, under suitable circumstances a plaintiff may perform it for him and be granted restitu-

tionary relief.62 The most clearly established illustration involves the
obligation of a man to provide necessaries for his family. Numerous
cases hold that when he refuses to meet his obligation a third person
58. 1 T.R. 20, 99 Eng. Rep. 949 (K.B. 1785).
59. 54 N.D. 346, 209 N.W. 784 (1926). See also Saltz Bros., Inc. v. Saltz, 122 F.2d
79 (D.C. Cir. 1941) (plaintiffs continued to act as managers after being discharged);
Mulligan v. Kenny, 34 La. Ann. 50 (1882) (plaintiff spent more in repairing church
tower than expressly ordered).
60. Keith v. de Bussigney, 179 Mass. 255, 60 N.E. 614 (1901); Earle v. Coburn,
130 Mass. 596 (1881); Force v. Haines, 17 N.J.L. 385 (Sup. Ct. 1840). The first
two cases involved a horse; the last, a slave. As applied to living creatures, especially
a human being, the application of this rule seems very questionable. -Cf. Great
Northern Ry. v. Swaffield, L.R. 9 Ex. 132 (1874) (horse). "But no man can be
compelled to pay salvage, unless he chooses, to take the property back." Cornu v.
Blackburne, 2 Doug. 641, 649, 99 Eng. Rep. 406, 410, (K.B. 1781) (Lord Mansfield).
See also Lambros Seaplane Base, Inc. v. The Batory, 215 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1954).
61. Mehl v. Norton, supra note 12 (occupancy of land, with the planting of crops);
Zawada v. Pennsylvania Sys. Bd. of Adjustment, 392 Pa. 207, 140 A.2d 335 (1958)
(serving as officer of union).
62. See the statement of the rule and exception in Keith v. de Bussigney, supra note
60, at 259, 60 N.E. at 615: "The rule is that one cannot be held liable on an implied
contract to pay for that which he declines to permit to be done on his account. The
exception to the rule is that when the law imposes upon one an obligation to do something which he declines to do, and which must be, done to meet some legal requirement,
the law in some cases treats performance by another performance for him, and implies
a contract on his part to pay for it."
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may perform it and hold him liable.63 Thus in the striking case of
Carr v. Anderson,64 where the defendant's wife had been committed
to a mental institution and he apparently wanted to keep her there,
he was held liable to an attorney for services rendered in having her
65
declared competent and released.
Another group of cases has involved the failure of a local government, or its agency, to perform a duty imposed upon it by statute.
Thus, recovery has been allowed to one who performed the defendant's
duty of providing necessaries for a pauper 66 (especially in case of an
emergency) ,67 supplying transportation to school children, 68 preparing a public road 69 and arranging for publication in a county news70
paper.
A study of these cases indicates several limitations on the scope of
the exception. First, although there are a few cases to the contrary,7 1
relief will not ordinarily be given in the case of a duty created by
private contract;

2

for relief to be given, the private obligation must

63. See, e.g., Davis v. Fyfe, 107 Cal. App. 281, 290 Pac. 468 (Dist. Ct. App. 1930)
(money supplied to purchase necessaries); Ott v. Hentall, 70 N.H. 231, 47 Atl. 80
(1900) (necessaries). Sometimes the court speaks of an agency of necessity, but the
relief is truly in restitution. See WOODWABD, QUASI ComAcr § 203 (1913). On the
supplying of necessaries (medical services) to a child, see the excellent opinion of
Vanderbilt, C.J., in Greenspan v. Slate, 12 N.J. 426, 97 A.2d 390 (1953). Other cases
are collected in the comments on this case in 3 DE PAUL L. ltv. 121 (1953), 8
Rurcuns L. REv. 415 (1953), 4 SYPAcusE L. REv. 375 (1953), 27 TEMP. L.Q. 227
(1953), 16 U. DEr. L.J. 206 (1953) and 14 U. Pr. L. REv. 619 (1953). Starting
with Jenkins v. Tucker, 1 H. B1. 90, 126 Eng. Rep. 55 (C.P. 1788), there are many
cases on funeral expenses. See Annot., 35 A.L.R.2d 1399 (1954). One may, however,
act officiously in this regard. See, e.g., Quin v. Hill, 4 Dem. 69 (Surf. Ct. N.Y. 1866),
where the mother of the decedent took complete charge out of the hands of the husband.
64. 154 Minn. 162, 191 N.W. 407 (1923).
65. Said the court: "It is unimportant that the husband, who does not furnish the
necessary, does not want it furnished, or forbids its furnishing, or declares in advance
that he will not pay. The law imposes the obligation, and enforces it by a contract
remedy." Id. at 165, 191 N.W. at 407.
66. See, e.g., Eckman v. Township of Brady, 81 Mich. 70, 45 N.W. 502 (1890);
Trustees of Cincinnati Township v. Ogden, 5 Ohio 23 (1831).
67. Compare Burnham v. Lincoln County, 128 Neb. 47, 257 N.W. 491 (1934), with
Sayre v. Madison County, 127 Neb. 200, 254 N.W. 874 (1934). See Comment, 13
NEB. L. BULL. 325 (1934); Note, 19 TEN. L. REv. 365 (1946).
68. See Sommers v. Putnam County Bd. of Educ., 113 Ohio St. 177, 148 N.E. 682
(1925); Rysdam v. School Dist., 154 Ore. 347, 58 P.2d 614 (1936). Contra, Bruggeman
v. Independent School Dist. No. 4, 227 Iowa 661, 289 N.W. 5 (1939).
69. French v. Lewis & Clark County, 87 Mont. 448, 288 Pac. 455 (1930), 29 MieH.
L. REV. 119 (1930).
70. Board of Comm'rs of Decatur County v. Greensburg Times, 215 Ind. 471, 19
N.E.2d 459, rehearing denied, 215 Ind. 471, 20 N.E.2d 647 (1939).
71. Henry v. Knight, 74 Ind. App. 562, 122 N.E. 675 (1919); Forsyth v. Canson, 5
Wend. 558 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1830); Rundell v. Bentley, 53 Hun 272, 6 N.Y. Supp. 609
(Sup. Ct. 1889). These cases involved contracts to support a relative, performed on
defendant's failure by another relative.
72. See, e.g., Moody v. Moody, 14 Me. 307 (1837); Wilson v. Combs, 203 Miss.
286, 33 So. 2d 830 (1948). These also involve contracts for support.
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be one in which there is a strong public interest.73 Second, in the
case of a statutory obligation, if there is some other adequate method
of enforcing it, that method may need to be employed. * Courts often
insist on an action which is brought for the direct purpose of determining whether an obligation exists instead of an action of restitution, which is for the purpose of preventing unjust enrichment and
thus raises the question of the existence of the obligation only indirectly.75 Thirdly, the language of the statute is very important. It
may be construed as providing for a recovery only if its terms are
explicitly followed, thus eliminating any common law remedy in
restitution. 76 Finally, there is some indication that plaintiff must show
77
that he was an appropriate person to perform the duty.

This matter of the appropriate person to perform the duty may also
play a significant role in expanding the scope of the exception. Thus,
one who is acting to protect his own property or his own interests
may perform another's duty, even his contractual duty, such as payment of a debt, and be entitled to restitution, despite the latter's
73. In Sommers v. Putnam County Bd. of Educ., supra note 68, the court stated
that the obligation must be one of "grave public concern." This was taken from
WooDwARD, QuAsi CoNTRAcTs § 194 (1913). Keener's language, "interest which the
public has in its performance," is criticized by Woodward as too broad. The English
court has refused to distinguish between a contractual duty and a statutory duty, not
granting relief in either case. In re National Motor Mail-Coach Co., [1908] 2 Ch. 515
(C.A.).
74. Thus, if mandamus will provide adequate relief, resort to it may be required.
See, e.g., Noble v. Williams, 150 Ky. 439, 150 S.W. 507 (1912), where teachers
furnished school supplies and sued for their value. Even in Ohio where the Sommers
case allowing restitutionary relief in the school-transportation situation was decided,
it was later held that the plaintiff must first exhaust his administrative remedies before
himself supplying the transportation. Halliday v. Marchington, 44 Ohio App. 132, 184
N.E. 698 (1932). The existence of an emergency requiring immediate action may be
very pertinent in determining whether the other relief is adequate.
75. An early illustration is Stokes v. Lewis, supra note 58, where one parish hired
a sexton for itself and a second parish, paid him his salary and then sought contribution.
Lord Mansfield indicated that the real question was whether the sexton was properly
selected, and that a suit by him against the second parish was the right way to try it
rather than this suit in quasi contract.
76. See, e.g., Bruggeman v. Independent School Dist. No. 4, supra note 68 (school
transportation); Frontier County v. Lincoln County, 121 Neb. 701, 238 N.W. 317
(1931) (care of pauper). Cf. Stem v. Haas, supra note 59 (plaintiff must show
that he did no more than the statute requires); Manhattan Fire-Alarm Co. v. Weber, 22
Misc. 729, 50 N.Y. Supp. 42 (Sup. Ct. 1898) (no showing that defendant might not
have compiled with the statute in some other way).
77. There has been no real indication of this in the cases involving the supplying of
necessaries to members of the defendant's family, but it has arisen in the cases of a
statutory duty. There it appears that the plaintiff must have some personal interest in
the performance of the duty. Thus, when recovery was allowed, the plaintiff's own
children were transported by him (though he might take others in addition), and it
was the plaintiff's own land which was served by the road which he laid out. See
discussion in Sommers v. Putnam County Bd. of Educ., supra note 68; WooowAmm,
QuAsi CONTRACT § 196 (1913).

1198

VANDERBILT- LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. 19

deliberate refusal to perform it himselLf 8 There are also cases holding that if the plaintiff has a moral obligation, he may perform the
defendant's duty, and recover.7 9 All of these cases are more completely considered subsequently.m
D. No Recovery for Benefits Conferred Without Suitable
Opportunity To Decline, in Absence of Reasonable Excuse for Failure To Afford Opportunity
A person is ordinarily not required to pay for benefits which were
thrust upon him with no opportunity to refuse them. The fact that
he is enriched is not enough, if he cannot avoid the enrichment. 81
On the other hand, if the plaintiff, before bestowing the benefit on
the defendant, notifies him and thus gives an opportunity to decline,
the defendant, if he accepts the benefit, will be held liable. This may
be on the basis of an actual contract-one implied-in-fact from the
conduct of the parties, to pay the reasonable value; 82 or it may be in
restitution on the basis of an obligation imposed by law to pay for
the enrichment. A similar problem arises when the defendant did
not have an opportunity to decline the benefit before the plaintiff
acted, but on a later occasion had the opportunity to elect whether
or not to take it. Here, too, it would appear that if he takes the
benefit, he should be liable.83 The real question is whether he has
a suitable opportunity to accept or decline. Two boat cases illustrate.
In Chase v. Corcoran, plaintiff rescued a drifting boat and repaired
it when he could not locate the owner. Later, defendant claimed it
and brought replevin when plaintiff insisted on payment. The court
78. Cf. Exall v. Partridge, 8 T.R. 308, 101 Eng. Rep. 1405 (K.B. 1799).
79. See, e.g., Boney v. Central Mut. Ins. Co., 213 N.C. 563, 197 S.E. 122 (1938);
Hult v. Ebinger, 222 Ore. 169, 352 P.2d 583 (1960); Application of Mach, 71 S.D.
460, 25 N.W.2d 881 (1947).
80. See pp. 1200, 1203 infra.
81. Though the law does not impose a liability on him to pay, he should be able to
bind himself by a promise to compensate for the enrichment. Thus, in Drake v. Bell, 26
Misc. 237, 55 N.Y. Supp. 945 (Sup. Ct. 1899), where defendant's house was replastcrcd
and painted by mistake, a promise to pay the reasonable value was enforced. See
generally Note, Promissory Obligations Based on Past Benefits or Other Moral Consideration, 7 U. Cm. L. REv. 124 (1939).
82. Often, the courts will speak of an adoption or a ratification.
83. Compare the remarks of Brett, M.R., in Leigh v- Dickerson, 15 Q.B.D. 60, 64-65
(1884): "Sometimes money has been expended for the behefit of another person under
such circumstances that an option is allowed to him to adopt or decline the benefit: in
this case, if he exercises his option to adopt the benefit, he will be liable to repay the
money expended; but if he declines the benefit he will not be liable. But sometimes
the money is expended for the benefit of another person under such circumstances, that
he cannot help accepting the benefit, in fact that he is bound to accept it: in this case
he has no opportunity of exercising any option, and he will be under no liability."
84. 106 Mass. 286 (1871).
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held that plaintiff might recover the cost- of storage and repairs,
since defendant could have chosen to let the finder keep the boat. 5
In 1. L. Carpenter Co. v. Richardson,86 a motorboat was left with
plaintiff to be tuned, but plaintiff did additional work on it. Defendant was held not liable for, the unordered work, since -he "was
entitled to the use of his motorboat, and in order to use it was
obliged to avail himself of such work as the plaintiff had performed
on it."8 7 The distinction is hard to express, yet it clearly exists. One
who had apparently abandoned property is not put to an unreasonable election when required either to pay for the expense of saving
and preserving it or to leave, it with the finder.' It is unreasonable,
however, to expect the owner of valuable property to give up that
property if he is unable to reject additional and unrequested benefits. In the case of improvements made upon defendant's land, he
has an election if they are removable, but not if they are incorporated
into the land.8
On this basis it would appear that when defendant's debt is paid
by plaintiff, defendant always has an option,:to accept or reject it,
since he could insist that he had not accepted the payment and intended to pay the debt himself, all of this without injuring himself
in any way or giving up anything. Although some -courts have taken
this viewpoint,'m the majority position disregards, it. The position is
less applicable to the performance of other contractual obligations.
1. Excuse..
Even in a case where defendant was afforded no opportunity to
accept or decline the benefit, restitution may -still be granted against
him if there was a reasonable excuse for failure to make the opportunity available. When is it not necessary to provide the option
to the defendant? There are several types of situations.
(a). Defendant Under Legal Obligation.-Ifthe defendant is under
obligation to perform a legal duty, such that if he refused to perform
the plaintiff might perform for, him and be entitled to restitution,
85. Cf. Hunter v. Felton, 61 Vt. 359, 17 Atl. 739 (1889).
86. 118 Conn. 322, 172 Atl. 226 (1934).
87. Compare the remarks of Pollock, C.J., in the argument in Taylor v. Laird, 25
L.J. Ex. 329, 332 (1856): "Suppose .J clean your property without your knowledge,
have I then a claim on you for payment? How*can you -help it?. . . The benefit of
the service could not be rejected withibut refusing the property itself."
88. Cf. Bichler v. Ternes, 63 N.D. 295, 248 N.W. 185 (1933); Jensen v. Probert, 174
Ore. 143, 148 P.2d 248 (1944).
89. See, e.g., Monast v. Marchant, ,72 AUt. 820 (R.I. 1909); Crumlish's Adm'r v.
Central Improvement Co., -38 W. Va. 390, 18 S.E. 456 '(1893); -c. Kenan v.'Hogoway,
16 Ala. 53 (1849). The position is ftflly sustainedc'by thi quotation from Brett, M'R
quoted in note 83 supra, -and 'the 'Western -Australian Cburt quoted it to ,reach tthtt
result in Cheeseman v. Industries Assistance Bd. 29 W. Astl. -L.R. 1 -('1926).-
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then it may be that plaintiff can proceed to perform for him without
notifying him and giving him the opportunity. But ordinarily this
can be done safely only in the situation where it is obvious that giving
the opportunity would be useless. Defendant should be afforded
the chance of performing the legal duty himself unless his conduct
or other circumstances manifestly indicate that he would have refused
to exercise that chance. 90 Of course, if he has already refused to
perform or is clearly in default, there is no need to give him an additional opportunity. 91
(b). Plaintiff Under Legal Compulsion.-If the plaintiff is under
a legal duty so that in performing his own obligation he discharges a
duty of the defendant, he is normally excused from the requirement
that he give the defendant an opportunity to perform. Of course, if
the plaintiff's liability does not arise until after the defendant is in
default, plaintiff is not under legal compulsion until his liability
arises. The cases usually involve sureties,
and joint tortfeasors. They
92
need not be treated in detail here.
(c). Plaintiff Acts To Protect His Own Property or Interests.-The
9 3 Plaintiff's coach,
leading case is the early one of Exalt v. Partridge.
left with defendants to be repaired, was seized by defendants' landlord as distress for rent in arrears, and he was forced to pay the rent
to repossess it. It was held that he was entitled to restitution. Similar
cases involve the payment of a senior mortgage by a junior mortgagee
to protect his interest, or payment of taxes by a mortgagee. 5
In other situations, the plaintiff acts to protect an interest rather
than property. Thus, in Zurich General Accident & Liability Insurance Co. v. Klein, 96 defendant sold property which had an unknown
tax lien on it, and plaintiff, insurance company for the attorney who
had searched the titles and failed to locate the lien, paid the lien.
Plaintiff was held entitled to restitution.- An interesting case in this
connection is Rivers v. Roe, 9 where a bank clerk, accepting payment
90. See, e.g., the language in Bradshaw v. Beard, 12 C.B. (N. S.) 344, 142 Eng. Rep.
1175 (C.P. 1862) (funeral expenses); Manhattan Fire-Alarm Co. v. Weber, supra note
76; WOODWARD, QUASI CONTRACTS § 195 (1913).
91. See p. 1198, supra.
92. See generally RESTATEN ENT, RESTITUTION §§ 76-102 (1937).
93. Supra note 78.
94. Subrogation is normally granted. See, e.g., Allyn v. Dreher, 124 Neb. 342, 246
N.W. 731 (1933); Marks v. Baum Bldg. Co., 73 Okla. 264, 175 Pac. 818 (1918); cf.
Stein v. Simpson, 37 Cal. 2d 79, 230 P.2d 816 (1951).
95. See, e.g., Wyoming Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Mills Constr. Co., 38 Wyo. 515, 269
Pac. 45 (1928). See generally 27 CoRNEL L.Q. 97 (1941).
96. 181 Pa. Super. 48, 121 A.2d 893 (1956).
97. Cf. Kamarata v. Hayes Freight Lines, Inc., 123 Ind. App. 222, 108 N.E.2d 723
(1952), where a freight line failed to collect from the consignee and paid the shipper;
held, it was subrogated to the shipper's right against the consignee.
98. 4 U.C.C.P. 21 (1854).
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on a note from defendant, later showed up twenty-five pounds short
and was required by the bank to pay it. He was permitted to recover
from the defendant on proof that the total amount had not been paid.
Courts differ as to whether plaintiff must have been acting to prevent
a legal liability on his part. Thus two early cases disagree as to
whether a sheriff who failed to execute on property, paying the amount
himself, can obtain reimbursement, 9 and two recent cases similarly
disagree as to whether a party who claims he was not negligent but
nevertheless pays the amount of the injured party's loss can recover
against the person who he claims to have been negligent. 1 0
(d). Plaintiff Confers Benefit Under Mistake.-If plaintiff pays defendant's debt under the mistaken apprehension that he was himself
under a duty to do it or that he was protecting his own property,
there is less reason to treat him as being officious, and the courts
will usually grant restitution. 01' The mistake excuses plaintiff from
the requirement of giving defendant an opportunity to decline, when
he is not placed in a worse position by the creation of an obligation
to reimburse the plaintiff. His duty to pay is merely transferred to
another party. A similar result is usually reached when the plaintiff
mistakenly performs defendant's legal obligation. 10 2 Somewhat analogous are the cases where plaintiff gratuitously provides necessaries
for the defendant under the mistaken apprehension that the latter is
financially unable to provide them himself. Again, recent cases allow
I03
recovery.

99. Ott v. Chapline, 3 Har. & McH. 323 (Gen. Ct. Md. 1793) (yes); Jones v.
Wilson, 3 Johns. R. 434 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1808) (no).
100. Crain Bros. v. Duquesne Slag Prod. Co., 273 F.2d 948 (3d Cir. 1959) (no);
Standard Motor Car Co. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 97 So. 2d 435 (La. App.
1957) (yes); cf. Tugboat Indian Co. v. A/S Ivarans Rederi, 334 Pa. 15, 5 A.2d 153
(1939). Compare also the split of authority as to whether an insurance agent who pays

the premium on a policy can recover from the person who was benefited. Boston SafeDeposit & Trust Co. v. Thomas, 59 an. 470, 53 Pac. 472 (1898)
Wilson Knitting Mills, 194 N.C. 281, 139 S.E. 456 (1927).

(yes); Whitehead v.

101. See, e.g., Sykes v. Sykes, 262 Ala. 277, 78 So. 2d 273 (1954); Brookfield v. Rock
Island Improvement Co., 205 Ark. 573, 169 S.W.2d 662 (1943)

(taxes); Ragan v.

Kelly, 180 Md. 324, 24 A.2d 289 (1942); Monast v. Marchant, supra note 89; Harrison
v. Harrison, 149 Tenn. 601, 259 S.W. 906 (1921); cf. Schuetz v. Schuetz, 237 Wis. 1,

296 N.W. 70 (1941).

Contra, Federal Land Bank v. Dorman, 112 Ind. App. 111, 41

N.E.2d 661 (1942). Compare Norton v. Haggett, 117 Vt. 130, 85 A.2d 571 (1952),
where the plaintiff's mistake was not in thinking he was paying his own debt, but in

thinking that he was acquiring the debt to enforce against the defendant. The adjective
epithet, officious, could still be appropriately applied, and no relief was granted.
102. McClary v. Michigan Cent. R.R., 102 Mich. 312, 60 N.W. 695 (1894); Blackwood v. Southern Ry., 178 N.C. 342, 100 S.E. 610 (1919); Blowers v. Southern Ry.,
74 S.C. 221, 54 S.E. 368 (1906).

Contra, Rohr v. Baker, 13 Ore. 350, 10 Pac. 627

(1886) (contract duty); Johnson v. Boston & Maine R.R., 69 Vt. 521, 38 Ad. 267
(1897).
103. See, e.g., Old Men's Home, Inc. v. Lees Estate, 191 Miss. 669, 4 So. 2d 235
(1941); In re Agnew's Will, 132 Misc. 466, 230 N.Y. Supp. 519 (Surr. Ct. 1928);
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A somewhat different situation exists when plaintiff has by mistake
added improvements to defendant's property. Plaintiff's situation is
not materially different, since his,,mistake is still the reason for his
failure to give defendant an opportunity to decline. But defendant's
situation is quite different; now, unwanted and unneeded benefits
may be forced upon him. For this reason, a majority of the courts
have stated that restitution is not granted. 1 4 Even here, however, a
good number of cases have granted restitution, 105 and ff the "betterment statutes" are added to this group, restitution is granted in a
substantial number of states. 10 6 There is a clear enrichment, and the
balancing process of weighing the equities of the mistaken plaintiff
and the unconsenting defendant is a delicate one, whether done by
court or legislature. It is easy to see why the states are divided.
On principle there would be more reason to grant restitution when
the plaintiff has made necessary repairs rather than unneeded improvements. Several cases, however, have refused recovery, 107 and
it is not possible to say that this is the law.
(e). Plaintiff Acts Under an Emergency.-If an emergency exists
so that plaintiff cannot give defendant an opportunity to decline the
benefit before acting, this may excuse him from that requirement. If
other requirements are met, restitution is normally granted, provided
the plaintiff has acted reasonably.
Thus, in the saving of life, a physician, who is regarded as not intending to render his services gratuitously, and whose services can be
properly reduced to terms of a measurable benefit, is granted restitution. 108 A similar result is reached where a person saves or preserves
Conkling's Estate v. Champlin, 193 Okla. 79, 141 P.2d 569 (1943); cf. Upton-on-Severn
Rural Dist. Council v. Powell, [1942] 1 All E.R. 220 (C.A.) (fire services rendered
under mistaken belief defendant was in plaintiff's district). See Comment, 41 Micu.
L. REv. 149 (1942).
104. See RESTATEMENT, RsTtrTION § 42 (1937): Numerous cases are cited in the
Reporters' Notes. And see Annots., 104 A.L.R. 577 (1936), 57 A.L.R.2d 350 (1958).
105. See, e.g., Bright v. Boyd, I Story 478, 2 Fed. Cas. 127 (No. 1875) (C.C. Me.
1841), 2 Story 605, 2 Fed. Cas. 134 (No. 1876) (C.C. Me. 1843); Hardy v. Burroughs,
251 Mich. 578, 232 N.W. 200 (1930); cf. Jensen v. Probert, supra note 88.
106. See Merryman, Improving the Lot of the Trespassing Improver, 11 STAN. L.
fEv. 456 (1957); Note, 6 W. REs. L. REv. 397 (1955); see note 161 infra.
107. Darce v. One Ford Automobile, 2 La. App. 185 (1925); Winney v. Leuci, 189
Misc. 441, 74 N.Y.S.2d 585 (Sup. Ct. 1947). Perhaps these cases are explained by the
fact that they dealt with chattels, since the courts have been less inclined to allow
recovery in the case of personal property than in that of real property. See Isle Royale
Mining Co. v. Hertin, 37 Mich. 332 (1877). Recovery for repairs made to real property
through mistake was allowed in Karon v. Kellogg, 195 Minn. 134, 261 N.W. 861 (1935),
34 MicH. L. REV. 577 (1936). But cf. Lawson v. O'Kelley, 81 Ga. App. 883, 60 S.E.2d
380 (1950).
108. See, e.g., Cotnam v. Wisdom, 83 Ark. 601, 104 S.W. 164 (1907); Schoenberg
v. Rose, 145 N.Y. Supp. 831 (Munic. Ct. N.Y.C. 1914); Matheson v. Smiley, 40 Man.
247, [1932] 1 West. Weekly R. 758,, [1932]. 2 D.L.R. 787. In ,England, there is
statutory provision for recovery by a "medical practitioner" of a specific amount for
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another's property, so long as his services are not treated as gratuitous
and a properly measurable benefit is bestowed.1'9 Cases involving
funeral expenses also come within this principle. Obviously, there is
no opportunity to present the matter to the decedent's estate, or its
representative, for decision." 0 And finally, restitutionary relief is also
awarded in those cases where the plaintiff looks after animals of a
decedent, pending the qualifying of a representative of the estate
who can take over."'
(f). Plaintiff Acts Under a Moral Responsibility.-In a number of
cases a plaintiff has been granted restitution when he was not under
a legal obligation to perform a duty for the defendant but where he
had a moral obligation to act. In most of these cases the discussion is
posed in terms of the plaintiff's classification as a volunteer or not,
relief depending upon the classification.
Thus, in Ford v. United States,"2 plaintiff, an American soldier in
England, had stolen money from an Englishman. The United States
Government reimbursed the victim in accordance with an American
statute, and later caught plaintiff and confiscated some of his money.
In his action for the money, the Government was able to counterclaim
f6r the amount it had paid, on the ground, that it had "a moral obli gation to respond for depredations committed by a member of our
armed forces." In several cases, where the defendant had breached
a contract to provide support to a third party, a close relative of
that party who supplied the support was allowed to recover on the
ground that he was acting under "moral compulsion,"1 3 In a case
where a wife paid her husband's obligation, the .court-spoke of a
"moral duty or at least a moral privilege."" 4 In an interesting pair
"emergency treatment," against the "person who was using the motor vehicle at the
time of the event out of which the bodily injury arose." Road Traffic Act, 1960, 8 & 9

Eraz. 2, ch. 16, § 213.
109. See, e.g., Chase v. Corcoran, supra note 84 (finder); Berry v. 'Barbour, 279

P.2d 335 (Okla. 1955) (fire damage repaired when owner out of country); Great
Northern Ry. v. Swaffield, supra note 60 (bailee of horse). ICases like Bartholomew v.
Jackson, 20 Johns. R. 28 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1822) turn on the question of whether the

services were intended to be gratuitous or not, rather than on the issue of whether
defendant was given an opportunity to decline the services.
110. E.g., Cape Girardeau Bell Tel. Co. v. Hamil, 160 Mo. App. 521, 140 S.W. 951
(1911); Rogers v. Price, 3 Y. & J. 28, 148. Eng. Rep. 1080 (Ex. 1829); Annot., 35

A.L.R.2d 1399 (1954).
111. See, e.g., Todd v. Martin, 4 Cal. Unr6p. 805 37 Pac. 872 (1894); Wilder Grami
Co. v. Felker, 296 Mass. 177, 5 N.E.2d 207 (1936); cf. In re Bryant's Estate, 180

Pa. 192, 36 Ad. 738 (1897) (management of estate). But cf. Mathie v. Hancock, 78 Vt.
414, 63 AU. 143 (1906).
112. 88 F. Supp. 263 (Ct. Cl. 1950).

113. E.g., Henry v. Knight, supra note 71; Application of Mach, supra note, 79,
46 Micr. L. REv. 115 (1942), 32 MN. L. REv. 183 (1948). Colitra, Wragg v.
Wragg, 208 Iowa 939, 226 N.W. 99 (1929).
114. Hult v. Ebinger, supra note 79.
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of cases, an agent negotiated a contract for a principal, and, though
not legally bound, paid the third party when the principal reneged

on the contract. An early English case denied recovery against the

principal," 5 but the North Carolina case granted it." 6 Mere courtesy

or accommodation for a friend does not meet the requirement here."'
(g). Interests of Third Parties Involved.-There have been a few
cases suggesting that when public funds are used to pay the obligation

of someone else, recovery may be had, although an individual would

have been treated as a volunteer." 8 And in another case involving

a corporation which had paid the debts of its predecessor, it was held
might be granted to protect the creditors of the
that restitution
9

payor."

E. No Recovery for Benefits Incidentally Conferred
Where a plaintiff in the performance of his own duty incidentally

confers a benefit on the defendant, it is usually held that restitution
is not available. Thus, where one in possession of land hires the plaintiff to put an improvement on it, the fact that this inures to the bene-

fit of the owner does not create liability to make restitution.120 Similarly, where one benefits another's property in improving his own
property 12' or promoting his own interest in some manner, 122 restitu115. Child v. Morley, 8 T.R. 610, 101 Eng. 1574 (K.B. 1800) ("voluntary payment").
116. Boney v. Central Mut. Ins. Co., supra note 79 ("moral obligation"; court
also speaks of bona fide belief he had an interest to protect).
117. See, e.g., Beach v. Vandenburg, 10 Johns. R. 361 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1813) (payment of neighbor's tax); Tappin v. Broster, 1 Car. & P. 112, 171 Eng. Rep. 1124 (N.P.
1823) (mail carrier paid mail charges).
118. Inhabitants of City of Biddeford v. Benoit, 128 Me. 240, 147 AtI. 151 (1929)
(municipal corporation); Love v. Robinson, 161 Miss. 585, 137 So. 499 (1931) (stato
superintendant of banks). Apparently the rule does not apply when the defendant
is also a municipal corporation. See Inhabitants of South Scituate v. Inhabitants of
Hanover, 75 Mass. 420 (1857).
119. Slater v. Bright, 248 S.W.2d 915 (Ky. 1952).
120. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Nelson, 37 Ala. 484 70 So. 2d 822 (1954); Chatfield
v. Fish, 126 Conn. 712, 10 A.2d 754 (1940); La Chance v. Rigoli, 325 Mass. 425, 91
N.E.2d 204 (1950). In Burgess v. Grooms, 81 A.2d 338 (Munic. Ct. App. D.C.
1951), an electric subcontractor who installed certain fixtures in accordance with his
agreement with the general contractor, was unable to obtain quasi-contractual relief
from the owners. "Admittedly defendants have received a benefit by having the
fixture installed in their house. Speaking loosely, they have been 'enriched.' But
we cannot say as a matter of law that it amounted to an unjust enrichment." Id. at
339. See also Meehan v. Cheltenham Township, 410 Pa. 446, 189 A.2d 593 (1963).
121. In Ulmer v. Farnsworth, 80 Me. 500, 15 Ad. 65 (1888), plaintiff drained his
own lime quarry and thus also drained the adjacent quarry of the defendant. In
Loring v. Bacon, 4 Mass. 575 (1808), plaintiff, owner in fee of an upper room, repaired
the roof and this aided defendant, owner in fee of the room below. No recovery was
allowed in either case.
122. In United States v. Pacific R.R., 120 U.S. 227 (1887), the United States for
military purposes during the Civil War rebuilt a bridge on defendant's land that had
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ion is not granted.
A more difficult question has arisen when an attorney has rendered
services which benefit not only the persons who employed him but
also other claimants similarly placed. Thus, in Felton v. Finley,12 the
attorney was employed by two nephews to break the will of an
uncle; three others, who had refused to join in the employment of
plaintiff or the suit, then decided to benefit from the results. The
Idaho court first held that the plaintiff might recover since the defendants had voluntarily accepted the benefits of the services, but
then changed its mind and held for the defendants. On the other
hand, in Winton v. Amos, 124 the United States Supreme Court held
that attorneys who had, under employment with certain members
of an Indian group, rendered lobbying services which allegedly made
Federal funds available to all members of the group, would be
entitled to an "equitable charge upon the funds and lands for a
reasonable and proportionate contribution toward value of services
rendered and expenses incurred." The Court found applicable the
principle that one with a common interest in a trust fund who saves
it from destruction is entitled to reimbursement from the fund or the
other beneficiaries, 12 and also spoke of the "curious analogy to the
salvage services of the maritime law:'
The distinction between the incidental-benefit cases and the cases
where the plaintiff confers a benefit on defendant in protection of his
own property or interests is one only of degree, and the attorney
cases are close to the uncertain borderline. The courts may be
especially inclined to hold liability when the defendants consciously
and voluntarily elect to accept the benefits.1
III. SPECIAL PROBLEMS

A. Law and Equity
Because of the historical development in some areas of the law
of restitution, relief has been more freely given in equity than at law,
been burned. In Green Tree Estates, Inc. v. Furstenberg, 21 Wis. 2d 193, 124 N.W.2d
90 (1963), plaintiff, a real estate developer, put in curb, gutter and street base improvements to facilitate obtaining a loan from the FHA. In neither case were the
property owners held liable.
123. 69 Idaho 381, 209 P.2d 899 (1959).
124. 255 U.S. 373 (1921).
125. Relying on Trustees of the Internal Improvement Fund v. Greenough, 105 U.S.
527 (1881).
126. With the Winton case, contrast Coleman v. United States, 152 U.S. 96 (1894),
where attorneys rendered services for clients leading toward vacating of land titles.
This inured incidentally to the benefit of the federal government but no compensation
was granted.
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and there have been differences in the form of the remedy. There
is less of this in the area involving benefits conferred without request
than in several other fields.
I The equitable remedy of subrogation may of course, be available
when relief is granted for paying the debt of another. 27 But because
of the traditional maxim that equity will not aid a volunteer, though
it involves a misapplication in connection with the type of volunteer
involved here,128 equity has not developed a more liberal set of rules
regarding the person who pays the debt of another. 29 A series of
lower court decisions during the early part of this century suggested
that the English courts of equity were about to develop a position
permitting recovery as a general rule.130 The Court of Appeal in 1938
apparently repudiated them, however, and indicated that the common
law rule of no-recovery would apply in equity too.131

One place where the rules of equity have been more liberal is in
regard to the putting of improvements on land under mistake as to
ownership. It is quite generally held that when the owner seeks
equitable relief, the court of equity will require him to do equity
and to compensate for the value of the improvements, as a condition
of receiving assistance.-1 In some jurisdictions a stronger position has
been taken and it is1 33held that a court of equity will grant affirmative
restitutionary relief.

B. PayingAnother's Debt

It is not clear why the courts have continued to hold with such
rigidity that one who pays another's debt is not entitled to restitution
from him. At early common law, a chose in action was not assignable
for reasons of champerty and maintenance.24 For a long time,
127. See, e.g., Love v. Robinson, supra note 118; Boney v. Central Mut. Ins. Co.,
supra note 79; Hult v. Ebinger, 222 Ore. 169, 352 P.2d 583 (1960); SHELDON,
SuBRoGATIoN, ch. 8 (1893); Note, Subrogation in Favor of a "Volunteer," 39 HAnv.
L. REv. 381 (1926).
128. See supra note 4.
129. In a few cases, a somewhat more liberal attitude has indicated that relief
may be more fully given in situations involving mistake or fulfillment of a moral
obligation. See, e.g., the cases cited in note 127 supra.
130. See, e.g., Butler v. Rice, [1910] 2 Ch. 277 (C.A.); A. L. Underwood, Ltd. v.
Bank of Liverpool and Martins, [19243 1 K. B. 775 (C.A,); B. Liggett (Liverpool),
Ltd. v. Burclays Bank, [1928] 1 K.B. 48.
131. In re Cleadon Trust, Ltd., [1939] Ch. 286 (C.A. ,1938) (strong dissenting
opinion by Greene, M. R.).
132. E.g., Hawkins v. Brown, 80 Ky. 186 (1882); Freichnecht v. Meyer, 39 N.J.
Eq. 551 (Ct. Err. & App. 1885); Jensen v. Probert, supra note 88.
133. See, e.g., Bright v., Boyd, supra note 105; Hardy v. Burroughs, supra note 105;
Hatcher, v. Briggs, 6 Ore. .31 -(1876).
134. See 4 ConBiN, -CoNTmAcTvs § 856 (1951); 3 WILuST6N, CoNTRAcrs § 405
(rev.ed. 1938).
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however, it has been held that a debt is freely assignable, without

regard to the consent of the debtor.135 Even officious motives on the
part of the payor-purchaser make no difference so long as he obtains
a valid assignment. Where there is no express assignment, the position
of the debtor is not made worse than it was prior to the payment,

if the payment is treated as the equivalent of an assignment. Indeed,
some courts have spoken of an equitable assignment which puts the
13 6
payor in the position to enforce the original obligation as his own.
One objection which has sometimes been raised to this suggestion is
that the payment amounts to a discharge of the debt, which therefore
137
no longer exists to be enforced. This argument is merely technical,
and any validity in it is met by adopting the approach of equity in
utilizing the remedy of subrogation. There, equity retains or revives

the lien for the benefit of the payor, who steps into the shoes of the

original obligee. 38 This is also wbat happens when one pays an
unsecured debt of another, and the only reason why subrogation has

not been applied is the old maxim that equity will not aid a volunteer.
With the free assignability of choses in action there is no longer
any reason to look on the payor with more disfavor than an assignee. 39
Since the payor merely steps into the shoes of the original creditor,

he cannot change the original obligation, and the debtor's burden is
in no way increased.
135. See 4 CoRBiN, CONTRACTS § 865 (1951); 3 WLLISTON, CONTRACTS 412
(rev. ed. 1938).
136. Neely v. Jones, 16 W. Va. 625 (1880); Crumlish's Adm'r v. Central Improvement Co., supra note 89; see Brown v. Inhabitants of Chesterville, 63 Me. 241 (1874);
cf. Neer v. Neer, 80 S.W.2d 240 (Mo. App. 1935).
137. See 6 Conwn, CONTRACTS § 1285 (1951); 6 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS §§ 185761 (rev. ed. 1938); Cold, Accord and Satisfaction by a Stranger, 19 CAN. B. REv. 165
(1941). Compare Walter v. James, L.R. 6 Ex. 124 (1871), where a third party paid
defendant's debt as defendant's agent, even though his authority had been countermanded. Subsequently, "and before any act of defendant assenting to or adopting
the payment, he requested plaintiff to return him the money, which was accordingly
done." Held, plaintiff can recover from defendant, and defendant's plea of payment
fails.
138. See 5 PoMmaoY, EQurry JtumsBRTDENCE § 2349 (4th ed. 1919); SHiEL.o1N,
SunnocArboN § 6 (2d ed. 1893).
139. Indeed, if the debt is in the form of a negotiable instrument an express assignment is no- longer necessary. The Uniform Commercial Code, § 3-603(2), -provides:
"Payment or satisfaction may be made with the consent of the holder by any person
including a stranger to the instrument. Surrender of the instrument to such a person
gives him the rights of a transferee." In this connection it may be-relevant to recall
that in the prior Negotiable Instruments Law, based on the common law, a third party
might intervene to protect the credit of the drawer of a bill which had been protested
for nonpayment, by paying it, and he would then be entitled to restitution. See NIL
§§ 1"'1-77; RESTATE ENT, RESrTTTON § 117(2) (1937). This provision was omitted
from.the UCC as having been rendered obsolete by modem methods of communication
which. make it possible to get in touch with the drawer almost -immediately. See UCC
§ .3-603, comment 2.
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Look at the situation now from the standpoint of the debtor. If
he has his debt paid and has no further obligation, he has clearly
been enriched. And he just as clearly has a full opportunity to accept
or decline the benefit. If he wishes, he may elect to disregard the
payment and to insist that he be permitted to pay his own debt to
the creditor. On the other hand, if he accepts the payment of his debt,
he accepts the enrichment and should be required to make restitution.
A procedural device which would make this clear but which apparently
has not been utilized, would be for the plaintiff to join the debtor
and the creditor in a single action, suing in the alternative. If the
debtor elects to regard the plaintiff's action as a payment of his debt,
he should be liable on the ground of his unjust enrichment; if he
elects to regard it as not being a payment, he is still under obligation
to the creditor, and the creditor should be liable to the plaintiff on
the ground of his unjust enrichment. This method of bringing suit,
if used, might constitute a means of bringing the substantive law into
accord with modern conditions.
Whatever validity the no-relief-for-the-volunteer rule has, it does not
apply to the payment of another's debt. For the opposite rule could
not increase the debtor's burden; and the true volunteer, the officious
person who is consciously trying to interfere in the debtor's affairs,
can do that anyway by taking an express assignment. The no-recovery
rule damages only the altruistic individual who was trying to help,
or the person who was acting under a mistake. Is any social policy
promoted by this anomaly? No, not even logical consistency is
promoted by it.140

C. Relationshipto the Law of Salvage and the Civil Law
The law of salvage, as applied by both British and American courts,
affords a marked contrast to the restrictive attitude of the common
law. One who saves property from impending danger at sea is held
entitled to compensation. 141 His compensation includes reimbursement
of his expenses, the value of his services, a consideration of the benefit
to the owner, involving the value of the property, and a reasonable
142
reward in addition. To enforce it he is given a lien on the property.
140. See discussion generally in Hope, Officiousness, 15 CORNELL L.Q. 205, 205-21
(1929); Note, Subrogation and the Volunteer Rule, 24 VA. L. RnV. 771 (1938). See
also 5 Pomnmoy, EQurrY JUISPRtUDENCE § 2348 n.91 (4th ed. 1919); STOLJAR, QUASI-

CoNTRC'T 141-45 (1964).
141. See generally GoF7 AND JoNEs, REsunoN, ch. 15 (1966); KENNEDY, CIVM
SALVAGE (4th ed. 1958); Noiuus, SALVAGE (1958); Grwonn & BLAcK, ADMNRALTY,

oh. 8 (1957); RoB NsoN, ADmPtALTY, ch. 15 (1939); Knauth, Aviation and Salvage:
The Application of Salvage Principlesto Aircraft, 36 CoLum. L. REV. 224 (1936).
142. The fact that the relief has normally been in the form of a lien on the
property has meant that the courts have proved less ready in giving remedy in cases
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prove that he is a volunteer; a preTo be entitled to relief he must
43
existing duty disqualifies him.
No adequate explanation has been given for this remarkable con-

trast with the common law, other than the historical development. It

was referred to by Chief Justice Marshall in Mason v. Ship Blaireau,14

but 1without
explanation. In Falcke v. Scottish Imperial Insurance
45
Co., the English Court of Appeal expressly rejected an analogy to
salvage and refused to allow recovery by one who paid the obligation
of another in order to have an insurance policy.1' The only discovered case where the salvage analogy was used to allow recovery
is the United States Supreme Court case of Winton v. Amos,147
where an attorney who obtained a fund for some claimants was
given equitable charge on it to permit compensation against others;
no reference was made there to the restrictive common law cases.

The practical explanation of the difference between the common
law and the maritime law may be that they are two different systems

of law, with entirely different backgrounds. Yet it may be pertinent
to see the reasons given by the courts for the salvage rule. On
several occasions, the assertion has been made that it is founded upon
principles of equity. 48 Frequently, it is said that the rule is based on
involving the saving of life. See Jarett, The Life Salvor Problem in Admiralty, 63
YALE L.J. 779 (1954).
143. KENNEDY, CrviL SALVAGE, ch. 3 (4th ed. 1958); NoRsu, SALVAGE, ch. 6 (1958).
It is also necessary that the services have been rendered under circumstances such
that a reasonably prudent owner would have accepted them. The Emilie Galline,
[1903] P. 106.
144. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 240 (1804). "If the property of an individual on land be
exposed to the greatest peril, and be saved by the voluntary exertions of any person
whatever; if valuable goods be rescued from a house in flames, at the imminent
hazard of life by the salvor, no remuneration in the shape of salvage is allowed. The
act is highly meritorius, and the service is as great as if rendered at sea. Yet the claim
for salvage could not, perhaps, be supported. It is certainly not made. Let precisely
the same service, at precisely the same hazard be rendered at sea, and a very ample
reward will be bestowed in the courts of justice." Id. at 266.
145. 34 Ch. D. 234 (C.A. 1886).
146. Said Bowen, L.J.: "The maritime law, for the purposes of public policy and
for the advantage of trade, imposes in these cases a liability upon the thing saved,
a liability which is a special consequence arising out of the character of mercantile
enterprises, the nature of sea perils, and the fact that the thing saved was saved under
great stress and exceptional circumstances." Id. at 248-49.
147. Supra note 124. Cf. Allison v. Jenkins, [1904] 1 Ir. R. 341, 348-49, where
the maritime law of general average and jettison was used as an analogy to allow
contribution.
148. For example: "This is a general principle of natural equity ....
Considering all
salvage therefore to be founded on the equity of remunerating private and individual
services, a Court of Justice should be cautious not to treat it on any other principle."
Sir Christopher Robinson, in The Calypso, 2 Hagg. 209, 218, 166 Eng. Rep. 221, 224
(Adm. 1828). "But the maritime law of salvage is based on principles of equity."
Lord Wright, in The Beaverford v. The Kafiristan, [1938] A.C. 136, 147 (1937).
Significantly, the admiralty courts never sought to base the recovery on the fiction of
an implied contract. See Sir Francis Jeune, P., in The Cargo ex Port Victor, [1901]
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the policy of encouraging mariners to undertake the task of rescue
by offering a reward. And it is sometimes added that there is the
countervailing policy of withdrawing the "temptation to embezzlement
and dishonesty" by allowing him "a liberal compensation."' 49 The
extent to which these reasons may apply to activities on land should
be apparent after reflection. Do they not have a reasonable application
to emergency rescues of property or land? The only real difference
is that custom has now developed so that the salvor at sea always
150
expects compensation and there is no presumption of gratuity.
The Roman law had a doctrine of negotiorum gestio, under which
one might take charge of the affairs of his absent neighbor .and
manage them in the latter's interest; he was then allowed to recover
for the value of his services if they were beneficial. The doctrine
passed into the civil law of the continent and, while its career has
been somewhat varied in several European countries, it is still found
and used in their law. 51
The attitude here is that of encouraging a man to act in an
altruistic fashion in aiding another. No deprecating remarks are
made about the volunteer or the intermeddler, and there is no refusal
to grant him relief. The common law has steadfastly refused to adopt
this attitude. 15 2 Some have explained it on the basis of the difference
in temperament of the Anglo-Saxon and the Latin, suggesting that the
characteristic independence of the former is not to be found in the
latter.153 The difference in the law may perhaps have started on
P. 243, 249 (C.A.). But cf. the argument in STOLJAR, QUASI-CONTACT, ch. 7, § 4,
(1964).
149. For presentation of both views see Justice Clifford in The Blackwall, 77 U. S.
(10 Wall.) 1, 14 (1869); The Clarita, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 1, 17 (1874).
150. Where there is a local custom that salvage services will be rendered without
expectation of pay, the American court held it to be against public policy and unenforceable, The Star, 53 F.2d 890 (D.C. Wash. 1931); but the British Columbia court
held it to be controlling, The "Freiya" v. The "R.S.," [1921] 2 West. Weekly R. 111,
59 D.L.R. 330 (Ex. 1921).
151. A thorough and penetrating treatment of the doctrine in modem European law
is to be found in Dawson, Negotiorum Gestio: The Altruistic Intermeddler, 74 Hav.
L. REv. 817 & 1073 (1961); see also DAwsoN, UNJUST ENRICHMENT 55-61, 136-40
(1951). For other treatments, see Heilman, The Rights of the Volunteer Agent Against
His Principal in Roman Law and in Anglo-American Law, 4 TENN. L. BEv. 34 & 76
(1925); Lorenzen, The Negotiorum Gestio in Roman Modern Civil Law, 13 CoaNme.L
L.Q. 190 (1928); Comment, Management of the Affairs of Another, 36 TvL. L. Rnv.
108 (1961).
152. The position of the law in Louisiana is hard to determine. Compare Police
Jury v. Hampton, 5 Mart. (N.S.) 389 (La. Sup. Ct. 1827), with Watson v. Ledoux,
8 La. Ann. 68 (1853). Compare Darce v. One Ford Automobile, supra note 107,
with Standard Motor Car Co. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 97 So. 2d 435 (La.
App. 1957). See Comments, 7 TeL. L. Ev. 253 (1933); 36 Tu. L. REv. 108 (1961),
153. See Allen, Legal Duties, 40 YALE L.J. 331, 375 (1931); Hope, Officiousness,
15 CoasNELL L.Q. 25, 29 (1929). This is characterizied as "nonsense" in STOLJAR,
QuAsi-CoNTRAcT 161 n.4 (1964).
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this basis, but it now seems more historic than anything else.
The prime significance of the law of salvage and that of the civil
law is that they indicate that a fully developed system of law may
operate effectively under a principle which seeks to encourage rather
than discourage and deprecate the rendering of aid to another without
his prior request. The law of salvage is administered by our own
courts without difficulty.
D. Liens

When restitution is granted to the person who voluntarily confers
a benefit on another, it is only rarely that he is given a lien. Thus, in

the early case of Nicholson v. Chapman,1 it was held to be a con-

version when a defendant who had rescued some timber from the
river, refused to turn it over to the owner without compensation.
The court expressed some doubt as to whether he was entitled to any
relief, but declared that "at any rate it is fitting that he who claims
the reward in such case should take upon himself the burden of
proving the nature of the service which he has performed, and the
quantum of the recompence which he demands, instead of throwing
it upon the owner to estimate it for him, at the hazard of being
nonsuited in an action of trover." 55
Since then numerous cases have held that a finder or a bailee is
not entitled to a lien for his services in preserving property. 156 On
the other hand, where relief is granted to one who makes improvements on land mistakenly believing it to be his own, there are indications that he will be protected by a lien on the land. 5 7 In a few other
isolated cases, liens have also been decreed. 1'
IV. CONCLUSION

The restrictions on recovery,.,which have been spelled out at considerable length have all been presented from a negative standpoint.
154. 2 H. B1. 254, 126 Eng. Rep. 536 (C.P. 1793). See also Binstead v. Buck, 2
Win. B1. 1117, 96 Eng. Rep. 660 (K.B. 1773).
155. 2 H. B1. at 259, 126 Eng. Rep. at 539.
156. See, e.g., Preston v. Neale, 78 Mass. 222 (1858); Moline, Milburn & Stoddard
Co. v. Neville, 52 Neb. 574, 72 N.W. 854 (1897); Amory v. Flyn, 10 Johns. R. 102
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1813); De la 0 v. Pueblo of Acoma, 1 N.M. 226 (1857); Meekins v.
Simpson, 178 N.C. 130, 96 S.E. 894 (1918). Statutes may change this, particularly, in
regard to finders, and the law of salvage is different.
157. See, e.g., Lee v. Menefield, 249 Ala. 407, 31 So. 2d 581 (1947); Rowe v.
Arnett, 241,Ky. 768, 45 S.W.2d 12 (1931); Jensen v. Probert, 174 Ore. 143, 148 P.2d
248 (1944).
158. See, e.g., Winton v. Amos, supra note 124 (equitable charge on funds obtained
by attorney's efforts); Berry v. Barbour, supra note 109 (contractor doing additional
work to save property in an emergency).
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It may now be possible to summarize them and present a general

principle stated in a positive fashion.
Perhaps the following two sentences will prove helpful in this

regard:
One who, without intent to act gratuitously, confers a measurable benefit
upon another, is entitled to restitution, if he affords the other an opportunity
to decline the benefit or else has a reasonable excuse for failing to do so.
If the other refuses to receive the benefit, he is not required to make
restitution unless the actor justifiably performs for the other a duty imposed
upon him by law.
Note that this is a statement of a general principle. It does not
purport to be a rule providing for results with precision. Such a
rule, or even a set of such rules, does not appear to be possible, or
even desirable. This statement contains numerous terms which obviously require considerable discretion in their application, and allow
the court considerable leeway.15 9 On the other hand, it does purport
to give direction to the line of thought of the court, and it aids in
putting meaning in the adjective "unjust," in the phrase, unjust
enrichment.
Note also that the statement eschews any use of expressions like
"volunteer" or "officious." Any study of the cases indicates that these
words have been question-begging epithets which have had the effect
of creating a personal disability in the plaintiff. The policy that
benefits cannot be forced upon a person against his will is incorporated
into the statement, but hopefully in a more meaningful and less
emotional fashion.
No attempt will be made to show the application of this statement
of general principle to the various types of fact situations involving
the saving, preserving or improving of ,life or property, or the per159. There is little value in trying here to paraphase or annotate the whole statement. Some of the expressions which require discretionary interpretation are the
following:
"intent to act gratuitously." This permits consideration of custom and use
of presumptions-of fact, not law. It could have been phrased in terms of "intent to
charge" as the Restatement does, the difference, of course, being one of burden of
proof. In Blackwood v. Southern Ry., 178 N.C. 343, 100 S.E. 610 (1910) it is put,
"not intended to be gratuitous."
"measurable benefit." The discussion, pp. 1186-90 supra is relevant here.
..opportunity to decline the benefit." There can be difference of viewpoint as to
whether there is an opportunity or not. See p. 1199 supra. Like "refuses to receive
the benefit," this does not apply to refusal to pay for it.
"reasonable excuse." This is one of the broadest terms in the statement, covering
several factors and affording considerable discretion. See pp. 1199-1204 supra. But it
makes the exercise of discretion manifest rather than disguised.
"justifiably performs . . . a duty." This is the most indefinite expression in the
statement. Yet it offers an approach which avoids an emotional epithet and promotes
frank consideration of the factors involved.
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formance of another's duties. A careful tracing of the application to
these situations indicates that the statement may be interpreted to
explain the existing holdings and to aid in reaching decisions.
In two types of situations it may have a liberalizing effect. One
involves the payment of the debt of another. Here the language on
which the decision would turn is that of the "opportunity to decline
the benefit." Courts holding for the defendant may explain by saying
that the opportunity must exist before the payment is made (unless
there is a reasonable excuse). It is quite appropriate to say, however,
that the opportunity may exist later; and that the defendant has a
true opportunity to decline by insisting that he pay the debt himself.
This would produce a different result, but one which should be
encouraged.
The other situation involves the placing of improvement on land
under mistake as to ownership. Here the language on which the
decision will turn is "reasonable excuse for failure" to afford an
opportunity to decline. The majority rule has been stated that restitution is not granted. 16 But a number of courts have consistently allowed
it, and a number of states have changed the rule by statute. The
existence of a statutory change and the procedural device of permitting recovery when the owner brings an action have undoubtedly
taken care of many cases where the courts would more forthrightly
have permitted recovery by judicial decision if it had been necessary.
The phrase "reasonable excuse" does not compel either result, but
allowing recovery.
would seem to be more persuasive toward 16
62
The existence of the "betterment statutes," ' the "finder statutes,2
63
and others" is an indication of
the "Good Samaritan statutes"
160. RSTATE MENT, B:sTrruToN § 42 (1937).
161. See, e.g., ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 45, §§ 56-61 (Smith-Hurd, 1944); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 1-340 (1953); TEx. Crv. STAT. art. 7393 (Vernon, 1960); VA. CoDE § 8-842
(1950); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 275.24 (1958). See Merryman, Improving the Lot of the
Trespassing Improver, 11 STAN. L. REv. 456 (1957); Note, 6 W. REs. L. RPv. 397
(1955). These are sometimes called "occupying claimants acts."
162. See, e.g., ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 50, § 32 (Smith-Hurd, 1966); Mo. STAT. ANN.
§ 447.050 (Vernon 1949). On estrays, see CMAs. AeBr. CODE § 391 (Deering, 1962);
MINN. STAT. ANr. § 346.04 (1957); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 79-2 (1953).
163. The statutes referred to here are those providing for reimbursement by the
government to the Good Samaritan who is injured or damaged in trying to prevent
the commission of a crime against another. See note 26 supra. Similar is the British
statute providing that a doctor who provides emergency treatment to the victim of a
traffic accident will receive specified compensation from the driver of the automobile.
See note 108 supra. See generally the abstracts of the talk at a conference held at the
University of Chicago School of Law, April 9, 1965, in THE GooD SA AuMrrAN AND THE
BAD (Sentry Ins. 1966), especially the comments of Norval Morris at p. 12.
The term, Good Samaritan statutes, is often applied to the acts passed in many
states providing that a doctor who renders emergency aid will not be liable to the
recipient for ordinary negligence. See Note, Good Samaritans and Liability for Medical
Malpractice, 64 COLUm. L. REv. 1301 (1964); Legis. Note, Good Samaritan Pro-
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dissatisfaction with the traditional rule of no-recovery. It may well be

argued that our law as a whole has become much more cognizant of
social needs and less insistent upon the attitude of rugged individualism. Courts today would probably be less likely to take a doctrinaire
approach, but ready instead to attempt carefully to balance the

interests and claims of the parties. They would be less likely to do
this, that is, if they were not frequently led astray from the real
problems by the question-begging epithet, volunteer.
The effort here has been to pose a statement of the general prin-

ciple which utilizes the valid idea behind the term but does not
permit it automatically to impose a disability upon the plaintiff,
barring him at the threshold of the court.
tection, 18 VAND. L. REv. 323 (1964). Like the indemnification statutes, these acts
have as a major purpose the encouragement of the rendering of such aid. In this
respect they appear to be somewhat unsuccessful. See Editorial, The Good Samaritan
and the Law, 273 N. ENG. J. MED. 934 (1965). Another purpose is to prevent "ingratitude suits" on the part of the person aided. In this respect the acts are similar
to automobile guest statutes, but both, of course, are special interest legislation.
On the general question of whether a legal duty should be imposed to rescue a
person in danger, see THE GOOD SAM.AIUTAN AND THE BAD, supra; Note, The Failure
to Rescue: A Comparative Study, 52 COLUm. L. REv. 631 (1951); Note, The Bad
Samaritan: Rescue Reexamined, 54 CEo. LJ. 629 (1966).
The subject of restitution by the state to the victims of crime has been much discussed in recent times. See especially, Symposium, Compensation to Victims of Crimes
of Personal Violence, 50 MIN. L. REv. 211-310 (1965); Legis. Note, Compensation
for Victims of Crime, 19 VAND. L. REv. 220 (1965).
[Since this paper has been put in print, the conference at the University of Chicago
described in the first paragraph of this note has been published as a 300-page Doubleday
Anchor Original Paperback. See THE GooD SAMARITAN AND THE LAw (Ratcliffe ed.
1966). Besides the conference proceedings it contains a good number of other articles
(such as Dean Ames' classic discussion of Law and Morals and Professor Dawson's
article cited note 20 supra) and a proposed model Good Samaritan Act. Most of the
emphasis is on the question of whether there should be a duty imposed by law to aid
a person jeopardized by criminal acts, and there is no strong concentration on restitutionary recovery by the Good Samaritan. See, however, pp. 63-89 (Dawson article),
115-17 (rescuer's claims under civil law), 135-39 (Norval Morris remarks), 237
(rescuer's recovery of expenses and rewards), and 283-84 (model act provision for
compensation).]
164. Another statute indicative of the legislative attitude is that in Maine providing
that when logs become mixed in the river so that they cannot be conveniently
separated one person may drive them all to the market and obtain reasonable compensation on demand, and if the owner cannot be ascertained he may libel the property
and dispose of enough to defray the expense. 38 ME. REv. STAT. ANN. § 975 (1964);
see Wadleigh v. Katahdin Pulp & Paper Co., 116 Me. 107, 100 At. 150 (1917).

